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Comments

Reservation of Rights Notices and
Nonwaiver Agreements
The standard liability insurance policy contains a clause providing
that the insurer shall have the right and duty to defend suits against
the insured.' Because the consequences of breaching the duty to defend are severe,' an insurer is reluctant to refuse to defend its insured
unless it is clear that the duty to defend has not arisen. The courts and
prudence require that, in a doubtful case, the insurer offer to defend the
insured.3 If the insurer elects to defend a suit against the insured de1. A typical automobile liability policy "defense" clause reads as follows:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurence, and the company shall have the
right and the duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of
such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are
groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient, but the company shall not be obligated to pay any
claim or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
See R. KEETON, BASIC TExT ON INSURANCE LAW 658 (1971).
2. In Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 280, 419 P.2d 168, 178-79, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 114-15 (1966), the California Supreme Court stated that an insurer who wrongfully refuses to
defend its insured is manifestly bound to reimburse the insured for the full amount of any obligation reasonably incurred by him. This liability extends to judgments rendered against the insured
or good faith settlements entered into by the insured. In Comunale v. Traders& GeneralInsurance
Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958), the same court indicated that the insurer's
liability for wrongfully refusing to defend the insured is limited to the limits of the policy plus
attorneys' fees and costs. This rule has generally been followed. See, e.g., Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1976); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 528-29, 88 Cal. Rptr. 246, 258 (1970). Several cases, however, have indicated that the insurer's liability for wrongfully refusing to defend the insured is not
inexorably imprisoned within the policy limits. See, e.g., Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d
739, 756, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 331 (1980); Chicken Delight of Cal. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 841, 849, 111 Cal. Rptr. 79, 84 (1973); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 529, 88 Cal. Rptr. 246, 259 (1970). The issue turns on
whether the insured's exposure to damages in excess of the policy limits is proximately caused by
the company's refusal to defend. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 65960, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958). All of these cases have addressed this issue in dicta only. If a
wrongful refusal to defend is coupled with a wrongful refusal to settle, the insurer's liability is not
limited to the policy limits. See id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
3. See Blackfield v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 245 Cal. App. 2d 271, 274, 53 Cal.
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spite the fact that it has knowledge of a defense to its duty to indemnify
the insured and fails to reserve its right to assert that defense at a later
time, the insurer will be equitably estopped to assert that defense in a
later action to determine the insurer's liability.4 Consequently, insurers
frequently offer to defend under a nonwaiver agreement or reservation
of rights notice.5
Both the nonwaiver agreement and the reservation of rights notice
are designed to obtain the insured's consent to allow the insurer to
maintain control of the defense and simultaneously preserve the insurer's right to assert a defense to its duty to indemnify the insured. A
nonwaiver agreement differs from a reservation of rights notice, however, in one significant respect. A nonwaiver agreement is a bilateral
contract, entered into by the insurer and the insured after the injured
party has asserted a claim against the insured, that gives the insurer the
right to defend the suit against the insured at its own expense while
reserving the insurer's right to disclaim liability based on a defense
known to it at the time the agreement is executed. 6 In contrast, a reservation of rights letter is a unilateral notice sent by the insurer to the
insured informing the insured of the insurer's intent to maintain control over the defense and of its belief that it has no obligation to indemnify the insured for any settlement or judgment rendered in the action.7
The insured's silence generally will be deemed an acceptance of the
reservation of rights notice.8
The basic problem created by these instruments is that the insurer's
interest in restricting its obligation to indemnify the insured seems to
conflict with its duty to defend the insured. Because of the conflict of
interest inherent in the insurer's position when it seeks to defend a suit
for which it denies liability, courts almost universally require that the
Rptr. 838, 840 (1966); Eichler Homes, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 238 Cal. App. 2d
532, 538, 47 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847 (1965); Richie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 251, 286
P.2d 1000, 1004 (1955).
4. See Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 755, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 331 (1980);
Boise Motor Car Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 62 Idaho 438, 449, 112 P.2d 1011, 1016
(1941); Beatty v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 106 Vt. 25, 33, 168 A. 919, 923 (1933).
5. See, e.g., Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 586, 126
Cal. Rptr. 267, 272 (1975); Sears v. Illinois Indem. Co., 12 Cal. App. 211, 224-25, 9 P.2d 245, 251
(1932); Employers' Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 560 (Tex. 1973) (noting that nonwaiver
agreements are taken as a matter of course in most cases which insurance companies are called
upon to defend).
6. Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 586, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 267, 272 (1975); see Note, Liability InsurancePolicy Defenses and the Duty to Defend, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1446-47 (1955).

7. See note 6 supra.
8. See, e.g., Roach v. Estate of Ravenstein, 326 F. Supp. 830, 836 (S.D. Iowa 1971); Ancateau v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 318 Ill. App. 553, 557, 48 N.E.2d 440, 442-43 (1943); United
States Cas. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 79 N.J. Super. 493, 503, 192 A.2d 169, 174 (1963); Keystone
Club Cas. Co. v. Mauro, 91 Pittsb. Leg. J. 73, 74-75 (1943).
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insured give consent to allow the insurer to control the defense once the
insurer has denied liability.9 Usually the insured consents to the agreement because the only alternative open to the insured if consent is withheld is to assume control of the defense at his or her own expense and
bring a separate action against the insured to determine if the insurer's
refusal to defend is wrongful.,'
This comment will examine the nature and incidents of the right and
the duty to defend. It will then delineate the two general types of defenses to liability available to an insurer. It will examine the conflict of
interest that arises between the insurer and the insured when the insurer asserts a defense to its duty to indemnify the insured but, nevertheless, desires to defend the suit against the insured. It will suggest
that as a result of this conflict, the insured is entitled to select independent counsel at the expense of the insurer in any case in which the insurer denies liability for the claim but in which the duty to defend has
arisen. It will also seek to define the situations in which the insured
may waive the right to independent counsel. Finally, this comment
will specifically outline the information that must be conveyed to the
insured in a nonwaiver agreement or reservation of rights notice to
guarantee that the insured makes an intelligent waiver of the right to an
unconditional defense.
WHEN THE DUTY TO DEFEND ARISES

A statement of the traditional rule used to determine when the duty
to defend arises appears in Maxon v. Security Insurance Company."I
"The general rule is that the obligation to defend is measured by comparing the terms of the insurance policy with the pleadings of the
claimants who sue the insured."'" This rule required the insurer to defend when the allegations of the complaint against the insured included
facts that brought the claim within the coverage of the policy.' 3 The
carrier had no duty to defend the insured if the injured party's complaint failed to allege facts bringing the case within the coverage of the
14
policy.
The rationale underlying the traditional rule was that the insurer
should defend any suit in which the allegations, if proved true, would
9. See, e.g., Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 479, 48 N.W.2d 623, 631 (1951);
Connolly v. Standard Cas. Co., 76 S.D. 95, 101, 73 N.W.2d 119, 122 (1955).
10. See generally 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcTIcE §4694 (1979).
11. 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963).
12. Id. at 616, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
13. See generally Moore v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 967, 969, 295 P.2d 154, 156
(1956); Retrner v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 90, 295 P.2d 19, 22-23 (1956); Ritchie
v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 250-51, 286 P.2d 1000, 1003-04 (1955).
14. See Rernmer v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 90, 295 P.2d 19, 23 (1956).
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entitle the claimant to a judgment against the insured for which the
insurer would be liable. Conversely, if the complaint failed to state
facts that would give rise to any obligation on the part of the insurer to
indemnify the insured, the insurer should not be obligated to defend
the suit. 15
Presently, the insurer's duty to defend the insured is not coextensive
with its duty to indemnify the insured. 16 In many cases the duty to
defend will arise even though there is no duty to indemnify. The California Supreme Court in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. 17 abandoned the

traditional test for determining when the duty to defend arises and
broadened the rule to conform to modem rules of pleading and the
reasonable expectations of the insured. First, the court held that if the
insurer ascertains facts which give rise to thepotentialof liability under
the policy, the duty to defend arises. 8 Second, the court held that no
longer may the insurer look solely to the allegations of the injured
party's complaint in assessing potential liability, but must consider information obtained from any source, including the insured. 19
Clearly the duty to defend under California law is expansive. It is
not, however, without limits. In State FarmAutomobile Insurance Co.

v. Fynt,20 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that an insurer may
refuse to defend, even though the complaint alleges facts that bring the
claim within the coverage of the policy, if the insurer has information
obtained from another source that clearly shows that no potential of
liability exists under the terms of the policy.2 ' Therefore, under the
modem rule, the facts alleged in the injured party's complaint against
the insured are of no greater significance than facts obtained from any
other source. 22 Thus, in California, the insurer's duty to defend extends to any suit in which the complaint alleges the nature and kind of
risk covered by the policy, and in which a potential of liability exists.23
To determine whether a potential of liability exists and, therefore,
whether the duty to defend has arisen, the insurer must institute an
investigation of the facts surrounding the claim against the insured.
California Insurance Code Section 790.03(h)(3) codifies the carrier's
15. See generally Leonard v. Maryland Cas. Co., 158 Kan. 263, 265-66, 146 P.2d 378, 380
(1944).
16. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 273, 419 P.2d 168, 173-74, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
109-10 (1966).
17. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
18. Id. at 276-77, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
19. Id.

20.
21.
22.
(1977).
23.

17 Cal. App. 3d 538, 95 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1971).
Id. at 548, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
See Mullen v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 163, 169-70, 140 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609
See 65 Cal. 2d at 275, 419 P.2d at 175, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 111.

1981 / Reservation of Rights Notices

duty to investigate by defining as an unfair practice the failure to adopt

and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of

claims. 24 The purpose of the insurer's investigation is to alert the insurer to any possible defenses the insured may have to the injured

party's claim and any possible defenses the insurer may have to its duty
to indemnify the insured in the event the injured party obtains a judg-

ment against the insured.
The insurer should not be deemed to have waived its right to assert a

defense to its duty to indemnify by proceeding with a prompt initial
investigation.25 Some carriers send a reservation of rights notice to the
insured at the outset of an investigation to prevent the insured from

mistakenly believing that, by undertaking an investigation of the claim,
the insurer is admitting liability for the claim. 26 Such a notice is unnec-

essary, however, if the investigation is instituted promptly.27 Because

waiver is defined as the voluntary relinquishment of a known right,2 8
the insurer cannot be deemed to have waived any rights during the

initial investigation stage. No waiver can occur until the insurer has
had an opportunity to investigate the claim against its insured and

thereby apprise itself of available defenses to its duty to indemnify.
THE NATURE OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND

Once the insurer determines that the duty to defend has arisen, it
must offer to defend the suit against the insured. Whether the insurer
will maintain its contractual right to control the defense will depend on

whether, in light of the defense known to the insurer, the insurer has
sufficient motivation to provide the insured with a vigorous defense.29
24. Insurance Code Section 790.03 provides in pertinent part:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance.
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the investigation and
processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
25. See generally 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §4693 (1979).
26. Telephone interview with William S. Jordan, Claims Supervisor, Metro California Division, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Jan. 21, 1980) (notes on file at the
Pacic Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Jordan interview].
27. See generally R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW §6.6 (1971).
28. Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 753, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 330 (1980);
Loughan v. Harger Haldeman, 184 Cal. App. 2d 495, 502, 7 Cal. Rptr. 581, 586 (1960).
29. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 538 (8th Cir. 1970);
Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 648, 394 P.2d 571, 576, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 736
(1964); O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 799, 167 P.2d 483, 486 (1946); Executive Aviation v.
National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347, 354 (1971).
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30
The nature of the proffered defense is dictated by the correlative right
of the insured to be defended unconditionally. 3' If the defense ten-

dered by the insurer does not fulfill the insurer's obligation to provide
the insured with an unconditional good faith defense, the accompanying contractual right to control the defense may be lost. 32 Hence, an
examination of the nature of the duty to defend is necessary to determine whether a particular proffered defense fulfills the insurer's duty to
defend its insured.
Because the duty to defend is a contractually imposed duty, 33 it must
be fulfilled in good faith.34 In California, a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is implied by law in every insurance contract. 35 The cove-

nant requires that each contracting party refrain from doing anything
36
to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.
For the insurer to fulfill its obligation not to impair the right of the
insured to receive the benefits of the agreement, it must give at least as
much consideration to the latter's interest as it does to its own.37 The
precise nature and extent of the duty imposed by the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing will depend on the contractual purpose.38
The purpose of the typical insurance defense clause is twofold.
First, the insurer desires to minimize its losses by reserving the right to

retain competent counsel who will conduct the defense efficiently and
thereby increase the likelihood that the insured will prevail in the suit

brought by the injured party or, in the alternative, effectuate a reasonable settlement.3 9 Second, the insured relies upon the insurer to protect

his or her legal, economic, and societal interests vigorously so that day
to day responsibilities are not interrupted.

Insurance companies, because they profit from inducing the insured
to purchase and rely on their coverage rather than securing other pro30. See generally Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
31. See Boise Motor Car Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 62 Idaho 438, 447-48, 112 P.2d
1011, 1016 (1941); Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 552 S.W.2d
497, 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
32. See e.g., Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 648, 394 P.2d 573, 577, 39
Cal. Rptr. 731, 737 (1964); O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 799, 167 P.2d 483, 486 (1946);
Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal App. 3d 799, 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347, 354
(1971); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 291 (Alas. 1980).
33. See note I supra.
34. See generally Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
35. See note 34 supra.
36. 24 Cal. 3d at 818, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
37. Id.at 818-19, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
38. Id.at 818, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
39. See Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability InsurancePolicy, 114 U. PA. L.
REv.734, 748 (1966).
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tection against injury, must place the insured's interests above their
own.40 The typical defense clause gives no indication that the insured
will be offered, much less required to accept, a defense under a nonwaiver agreement or reservation of rights notice. 4 1 Under well established principles the words of an insurance contract are construed
against the insurer.42 Because the typical defense clause states that, in
the event the insured is sued, a defense will be forthcoming, the insurer
should provide a defense without question in any case alleging the nature and kind of risk covered by the policy. If the insurer believes that
it has a defense to its duty to indemnify the insured, it may protect its
right to assert that defense by providing the insured with independent
requires that
counsel. 43 The insurance contract, if of any value at all,
44
the insured receive a definite and unequivocal defense.
An insured is not required to accept a defense tendered subject to a
nonwaiver agreement or reservation of rights notice.45 Under the current state of the law, if the insured rejects the tendered defense, the
insurer must either waive its coverage defense and defend unconditionally, or withdraw from the defense of the suit and risk being held liable
for wrongful refusal to defend.4 6 The independent counsel offer one
possible alternative. If the insurer nevertheless chooses to withdraw,
either party may seek declaratory relief to determine if the insurer
withdrew wrongfully.47
40. See Goodman & Seeton, Foreword.- Ripefor Decision, Internal Workings and Current
Concerns of the CaliforniaSupreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 309, 346 (1974).
41. See note I supra.
42. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107
(1966); 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §621, at 764-65 (3d ed. 1968).
43. See Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 347, 354 (1971); Employers' Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 634-35, 240 A.2d 397, 403-04
(1968).
44. See Boise Motor Car Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 62 Idaho 438, 447-48, 112 P.2d
1011, 1016 (1941).
45. See, e.g., 62 Idaho at 449, 112 P.2d at 1016 (1941); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill.
2d 187, 198-99, 355 N.E.2d 24,31 (1976); Three Sons, Inc. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 357 Mass. 271, 276,
257 N.E.2d 774, 776-77 (1970); Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 479, 48 N.W.2d 623,
631 (1951); Sneed v. Concord Ins. Co., 98 N.J. Super. 306, 314, 237 A.2d 289, 293-94 (1967);
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trainor, 33 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45-46, 294 N.E.2d 874, 877-78 (1973); Young
Men's Christian Ass'n v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 552 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.
416 A.2d 163, 165 (1980). But see Ferguson v.
1977); American Fidelity Co. v. Kerr, - Vt. -,-,
Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 254 Or. 496, 512, 460 P.2d 342, 348 (1969); Associated Indem. Corp. v.
Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2d 679, 692-93, 99 P.2d 420, 425-26 (1940).
46. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 537 (8th Cir. 1970); Charles J.
King, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 264 F. Supp. 703, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); American Fidelity Co. v. Kerr - Vt. -, -, 416 A.2d 163, 165 (1980).
47. If the insurer provides the insured with independent counsel when a question as to the
insurer's duty to indemnify arises, the rights of both parties can be protected without the necessity
of a declaratory judgment action. By eliminating the need for declaratory relief, the insured is
freed from the additional expense of a second action and the injured party's relief is not delayed
while the insurer and insured determine who will be liable in the event the injured party prevails
in the action against the insured. Once the insured's liability to the injured party is established,
either the insured or the insurer can seek declaratory relief. If the injured party's action against
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NATURE OF THE DEFENSE
ASSERTED BY THE INSURER

The types of defenses to liability that may be asserted by an insurer
fall into two general categories.4" The first group contains defenses
that, to be maintained effectively, require the insurer to take a position
on an issue of fact that confficts with the position the insured must take
on that issue to defend the action brought by the injured party. Thus,

these defenses present issues that are subject to proof in the injured
party's action against the insured. These defenses typically arise when
the insurer alleges that the incident falls outside of the coverage of the

policy. The second group of defenses includes those that do not, to be
maintained effectively, require the insurer to take a position adverse to
that which must be taken to defend the insured in the action brought by
the injured party. Thus, these defenses present issues that are not subject to proof in the injured party's action against the insured. These
defenses usually relate to an alleged policy breach by the insured.
A.

Issues Subject to Proofat Trial

If the defense on which the insurer bases its claim of nonliability is
inconsistent with the position that the insurer must take to defend the

insured in the action brought by the injured party, the insurer's interests come into conflict with the insured's interests.4 9 While the insurer
will want to see the issue resolved so as to absolve it of its duty to
indemnify the insured, the insured will want to show that the incident

fell within the coverage of the policy.5" This problem often arises
when the injured party alleges that the conduct of the insured which

caused the injury was intentional, but the insured maintains that the
conduct was merely negligent. 5' Because liability insurance policies do
not cover intentional torts of the insured, 52 the insurer's interest in the
the insured results in a defense verdict, the need for declaratory relief is eliminated. See generally
Note, Use Of The DeclaratoryJudgment Action to Determinea Liability Insurer'rDuty to DefendConflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965); Note, The Insurers Duty to Defend Under a Liability
InsurancePolicy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734 (1966).
48. See generally Browne, The Demise of the DeclaratoryJudgment Action as a Devicefor
Testing the Insurer's Duty to Defend- A Postscript, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 18 (1975).
49. See, e.g., Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 809-10,
94 Cal. Rptr. 347, 353-54 (1971); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 64 111. 2d 187, 198-99, 355 N.E.2d
24, 31 (1976); Prashker v. United States Guar. Co., I N.Y.2d 584, 593, 154 N.Y.S.2d 910, 917, 136
N.E.2d 871, 875-76 (1956); Employers' Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 635, 240 A.2d 397, 403-04
(1968).
50. For example, see 16 Cal. App. 3d at 804 n.l, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 350 n.l (1971).
51. See generally Thorton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 384 N.E.2d 335 (1978); Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 254 Or. 496, 460 P.2d 342 (1969); Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend an
Insured in a PersonalInjury Action under a Liability Policy That Excludesfrom Coverage Injuries
Caused by the IntentionalConduct of the Insured, 20 KAN. L. REv. 351 (1972).
52. California Civil Code section 1668 provides:
CERTAIN CONTRACTS UNLAWFUL. All contracts which have for their object, di-
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resolution of the issue conflicts with the insured's interest. If the insurer defends the insured, it will desire to have the insured found either
free from liability or guilty of an intentional tort. Either result would
absolve the insurer of liability. A determination that the insured acted
negligently will, by virtue of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, prevent
the insurer from denying liability for the claim.53 Hence, the insurer
would prefer a finding of nonliability or intentional conduct to a finding that the insurer's insured acted negligently. The insurer's position
that the
may give rise to legitimate fears on the part of the insured
4
insurer will not properly protect the insured's interests.
The First District Court of Appeal faced a similar situation in Executive Aviation v. National Insurance Underwriters." In Executive A viation" the insured was the operator of an aircraft sales and air taxi
business.5 7 An accident, in which several persons were killed, occurred
in one of the insured's airplanes while it was being piloted by an employee of the insured.5" The conflict between the insurer and the insured arose because the policy only covered charter operations if the
pilot in command held a valid license and appropriate ratings for those
operations.5 9 The pilot in command at the time of the accident was
qualified to conduct sales demonstration flights but was not qualified to
conduct charter flights.6 ° Because the insurer was faced with the paradoxical position of having to prove the fight was a charter flight to
avoid coverage, while such proof would jeopardize the defense of the
action brought by the injured party against the insured,6 1 the court held
that the insurer must relinquish exclusive control of the defense. 62 In
addition, because the duty to defend had arisen, the court held that the
insurer was responsible for the cost of counsel to represent the insured.63 The court noted:
[I]n a conflict of interest situation, the insurer's desire to exclusively
control the defense must yield to its obligation to its policy holder.
rectly or indirectly, to exempt anyone for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the
policy of the law.
California Civil Code section 533 provides:
An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured; but he is not
exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents or others.
53. See generally Scott, CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. I (1942).

54. See generally Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970).
55. 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 803, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 349.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 804, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
Id. at 803, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
Id. at 804, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
Id. at 804 n.l, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 350 n.l.
Id. at 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354.

63. Id.
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Accordingly, the insurer's obligation to defend extends to the reasonable value of the legal services and costs performed by independent
counsel selected by the insured. '
The "independent counsel" solution serves to protect the interests of
both the insured and the insurer. The insured receives the vigorous,
unconditional defense that it reasonably expected to receive and that
the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to provide.6 5
The insurer's interests are protected through its ability to participate in
the defense in conjunction with independent counsel selected by the
insured. 6 The insurer is able to take a position adverse to that of the
insured without compromising the insured's interests.6 7 The added expense of additional counsel seems insufficient reason to deny the insured a defense free from a conflict of interest.68
In Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Insurance Company,6 9 the Oregon
Supreme Court took a different approach to resolving the conflict of
interest dilemma that arises when an insurer denies liability for the
claim asserted against the insured but seeks to defend under a reservation of rights notice. The complaint in Ferguson alleged a willful trespass by an employee of the insured. 70 The coverage of the policy did
not extend to intentional acts of the insured or one acting at the direction of the insured. 71 The company offered to defend the insured under
a reservation of rights agreement.72 The insured refused to accept the
conditional defense and retained independent counsel. 7 The insurer
withdrew from the defense.7 4 On appeal of a subsequent action by the
insured to recover the cost of defending the suit, 7" the Oregon Supreme
Court held that the insured had been unreasonable in refusing the defense tendered by the company.76 While recognizing that the weight of
authority would support the insured's demand that the insurer either
defend without reservation or withdraw from the defense,77 the Oregon
64. Id.
65. Cf. Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 660, 320 P.2d 140, 146 (1958)
(holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to the duty to defend when potential
liability is in excess of the policy limits).
66. See 16 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
67. See id.
68. See generally 16 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354; Employers' Ins. Co. v. Beals,
103 R.I. 623, 635, 240 A.2d 397, 404 (1968).
69. 254 Or. 496, 460 P.2d 342 (1969).
70. Id. at 500, 460 P.2d at 344.
71. Id. at 499, 460 P.2d at 344.
72. Id. at 500, 460 P.2d at 344 (what the court refers to as a "reservation of rights agreement"
is, as those instruments are defined herein, a reservation of rights notice).
73. Id. at 496, 500, 460 P.2d at 344.
74. Id. at 500-01, 460 P.2d at 344.
75. Id. at 501, 460 P.2d at 344.
76. Id. at 512, 460 P.2d at 349.
77. Id. at 509, 460 P.2d 348.

1981 / Reservation of Rights Notices

court held that the rule in Oregon does not require the insurer to make
such an election. 78 The court noted that any conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured could have been eliminated by other
means. 79 First, the court noted that the divergent positions of the insured and the insurer at the liability trial regarding the nature of the
insured's conduct8" would prevent a determination of that issue from

binding the parties in a separate action to determine if the policy provided coverage because collateral estoppel 8 should apply only when

the interests of the insurer and the insured on the issue in question are
identical.82 Therefore, if the injured party's complaint alleges alterna-

tive theories of recovery based on negligence and intentional conduct, a
finding by the jury that an intentional tort has been committed would
not be binding on the insured in a later action to determine coverage.

The approach taken by the Oregon court is open to criticism in that
the court failed to consider the difficult position faced by the insured.
The insured must cooperate with the insurer in preparing the defense

or commit a breach of obligations under the terms of the policy.83 Pursuant to the cooperation clause, the insured could be required to pro-

vide the insurer with information that the insurer could later use to
establish that the insured's act was not within the coverage of the pol-

icy. In effect, the court's holding could create a situation in which the
insured would be required to transfer information to the insurer that
would not otherwise be available to it.84

The Ferguson8" court recognized as another conflict between the insured and the insurer the possibility that the insurer would only pro-

vide a token defense if it is aware that it can later assert a non-coverage
defense.8 6 If the insurer does not think that the loss on which it is de78. Id. at 512, 460 P.2d at 349.
79. Id. at 509-11, 460 P.2d at 348-49.
80. Id. at 510, 460 P.2d at 348.
81. The court refers to the "estoppel by judgment rule." As the court's discussion refers to
the issue of the nature of the insured's conduct, it would appear that the court is referring to the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
82. 254 Or. at 510-11, 460 P.2d at 348-49.
83. The so-called "cooperation clause" is included in virtually every liability insurance policy. A typical cooperation clause reads as follows:
Assistance and Cooperation of Insured. The insured shall cooperate with the company
and, upon the company's request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in
effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses
and in the conduct of suits. The insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily
make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any other expense other than for
such immediate medical and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time of
the accident.
See R. KEETON, BAsic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 655 (1971).
84. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 291 (Alas. 1980).
85. 254 Or. 496, 511, 460 P.2d 342, 349.
86. See 608 P.2d at 291; Note, Liabilily Insurance Policy Defenses and the Duty to Defend, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1448 (1955).
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fending is covered by the policy, it may not be motivated to achieve the
lowest possible settlement or otherwise treat the insured's interest as its
own. 87 The Ferguson court believed, however, that the insurer would
be adequately motivated by its knowledge that juror sympathy would
weigh heavily against it in a subsequent suit by the insured to enforce
the policy. 8 In addition, the court felt that if the insurer's policy defense against the insured was so strong that the insurer would give less
than a vigorous defense on the merits of the first action, it. would have
refused to defend the insured8 9at the time the insured first requested the
insurer to defend the action.
Although the Ferguson court's assessment of juror sympathy seems
to conform to experience,9" the belief that an insurer will not hesitate to

refuse to defend the insured when it has a defense to its duty to indemnify the insured may be misplaced given the severe consequences of
wrongfully refusing to defend. 9 1 These consequences make insurers extremely reluctant to refuse to defend a suit against the insured.92 If an
insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, it is certain to be held liable for
the settlement or judgment rendered against the insured if later a defense is found to have been warranted. 93 In addition, the insurer's liability for wrongfully refusing to defend may not be confined to policy
limits. 94 In contrast, if the insured must accept a defense under a reservation of rights notice, the insurer can insulate itself from liability for
wrongful refusal to defend by providing a token defense and thereby
restrict its potential liability to the limits of the policy. In addition, the
reservation of rights notice will preserve the insurer's right to deny coverage later. The possibility that the insured will receive a token defense
is eliminated if, instead of requiring the insured to accept a defense
tendered by an insurer who denies liability for the insured's acts, the
insured has the right to have independent counsel conduct its defense.
If the insurer is faced with the possibility of losing control of the defense each time it issues a reservation of rights notice, it will hesitate to
issue such notices based on spurious or weak defenses. Notices will be
utilized only in those cases where a legitimate coverage dispute exists.
87. 254 Or. 496, 511, 460 P.2d 342, 349.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment to Determine a Liability Insurer's Duty to
Defend-Conflict ofInterests, 41 IND. L.J. 87, 95 (1965).
91. See generally Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966); Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d 571, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964);
Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Note, The Insurer's
Duty to Defend Made 4bsolute. Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1328 (1967).
92. See note 2 supra.
93. See 65 Cal. 2d at 280, 419 P.2d at 179, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
94. See note 2 supra.
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B. Issues Not Subject to Proofat Trial
The second type of defense likely to be asserted by the insurer does
not require the determination of an issue at the trial of the injured
party's action that would affect the insurer's policy defense. A typical
example of this type of defense occurs when the insurer maintains that
it has no obligation under the terms of the policy because the insured
has breached the policy in some way. If the position taken by the insurer on the policy defense does not conflict with the position that must
be taken to defend the insured, the type of conflict that existed in Executive Aviation9 5 does not exist. Nevertheless, a recent Alaska case
found that a conflict of interest exists sufficient to entitle the insured to
demand control of the defense.
In ContinentalInsurance Company v. Bayless andRoberts, Inc. 96 the
insurer maintained that the insured had breached the cooperation
clause of the policy by lying during a deposition.97 Nevertheless, the
company offered to defend the insured subject to a reservation of rights
notice. 98 The insured refused to accept the company's offer and assumed control of the defense of the suit. 99 Some time later, the insured
entered into a consent judgment with the injured party.'0° The insured
then brought suit against the carrier for breaching its duty to defend the
insured.' 0 ' In this subsequent suit against the insurer, the Alaska court
attempted to resolve the dilemma created when an insurer seeks to defend under a reservation of rights notice but the insured refuses to consent to the proferred conditional defense.
The Alaska court carefully examined the approach taken by the Oregon court in Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Insurance Company, 02 and
held that, when the issue in dispute goes to the enforceability of the
policy rather than the coverage provided by the policy, the Ferguson
approach does not adequately protect the rights of the insured. 0 3 The
court reasoned that even if the insurer vigorously and properly defends
the insured, the insurer can nevertheless take actions that might
95. 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971). See generally Scott, CollateralEstoppelby
Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1942).
96. 608 P.2d 281 (Alas. 1980).
97. Id. at 285-86. An alleged breach of the cooperation clause will rarely be sufficient reason
for the insurer to refuse to defend because the breach must cause the insurer substantial prejudice
before it will be deemed grounds for relieving the insurer of its obligations under the policy. See
generally Hall v. Travelers Ins. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 304, 308, 93 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161 (1971).
98. 608 P.2d at 285.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 283.
101. Id.
102. 254 Or. 496, 460 P.2d 342 (1969).
103. 608 P.2d at 290 (Alas. 1980).
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prejudice the insured's position in a later suit on the policy) 4 The
opinion expressed concern that if the insurer has the right to demand
exclusive control of the defense, despite the fact that it claims it has no
obligations under the policy, it will be able to gain access to information not otherwise properly available to it, which it could use at a later
time to establish the insured's breach.'0 5 In addition, the court was not
persuaded by the Ferguson court's belief that when the insurer is defending under a reservation of rights notice or nonwaiver agreement it
is adequately motivated to achieve the lowest possible settlement for
the insured.' 6 In fact, the court suggested that the company failed to
settle in the case at bar because it knew it would later have an opportunity to assert the insured's breach as a defense to its obligation to pay a
judgment rendered against the insured. 107
The Alaska court held that when the insurer disputes the validity of
the policy as opposed to the coverage provided by the policy, the insurer must either relinquish control of the defense or defend unconditionally if the insured is unwilling to consent to a defense under a
nonwaiver agreement or reservation of rights notice. 0 8 The court indicated, however, that the insurer still may be able to preserve its defenses against the insured if it is willing to relinquish control of the
defense and fulfill its duty to defend the insured.'0 9 The court suggested that the insurer could preserve its defenses by offering the insured the opportunity to retain independent counsel at the insurer's
expense. 10 The court's suggestion raises a question as to the applicability of the independent counsel solution to situations that do not require the insurer to take a position adverse to that which the insured
must take to defend the action brought by the injured party.
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL SOLUTION

4.

The Needfor the Independent Counsel Solution

One distinction seems apparent between the coverage defense asserted in Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Insurance Company"'I and the

policy enforceability defense asserted in Continental Insurance Company v. Bayless andRoberts,Inc." 2 Because the former type of defense
104. Id. at 291.
105. Id.
106. Id.

107. Id. at 291 n.15.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 291.
See id. at 291 n.17.
Id.
254 Or. 496, 460 P.2d 342 (1969).
608 P.2d 281 (Alas. 1980).
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presents a conflict of interest that inevitably will manifest itself at trial,
a nonwaiver agreement. cannot serve to eliminate the conflict. 113 The
insurer's position is inimical to the insured's interests at trial. If the
insurer proves what the insured desires to prove, the insurer irreversibly commits itself to indemnifying the insured if the insured is found
liable to the injured party. In these cases, the conflict can only be
avoided by allowing the insured to select independent counsel at the
insurer's expense."14 In contrast, when the defense asserted goes to an
alleged breach of the policy, the conflict of interest between the insured
and the insurer will probably not manifest itself at trial. The issue that
will determine whether a breach has occurred may be so collateral to
the main action that the insured is willing to allow the insurer to defend
the suit. For example, the policy defense may focus on whether premiums were timely paid. In such a case, the insured may be well advised
to enter into a nonwaiver agreement because the issues in the main
action are so completely unrelated to the policy defense that the danger
of information transfer is very low. If, however, the insured has doubts
about the insurer's motivation or interest in providing a good defense
or settling the case, and the duty to defend has arisen, the insured
should be able to demand that the insurer abandon the defense and
defend without reservation or provide the insured with independent
counsel to represent the insured's separate interests.' 15 The insured's
decision on this matter may often turn on the strength of the defense
asserted by the insurer. If the insurer's defense is weak and the danger
of information transfer is low, the insured may believe that the insurer
is adequately motivated and able to protect the insured interests.
No California court has yet been called upon to decide if the independent counsel solution should be applied when the insurer's defense does not conflict with the insured's position on an issue that will
be resolved during the trial of the injured party's claim. It is suggested,
however, that the reasoning of the Alaska Supreme Court in ContinentalInsurance Company v. Bayless andRoberts,Inc. , 16is sound because

an inherent conflict of interests exists whenever the insurer disclaims
liability for a suit it seeks to defend. The insured may have legitimate
fears regarding the insurer's motivation to settle or otherwise provide a
vigorous defense." 7 In addition, the ever present danger that the insured may be required to produce evidence not otherwise available to
113. But see Employers' Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 634, 240 A.2d 397, 403 (1968).
114. See generally Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94
Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971); 103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 397.
115. See generally 608 P.2d 281; American Fidelity Co. v. Kerr, - vt. -, 416 A.2d 163 (1980).
116. 608 P.2d 281 (Alas. 1980).
117. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970).
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the insurer that could later be used to establish non-coverage justifies
the insured's18demand that the insurer relinquish exclusive control of
the defense.'
B.

Objections to the Independent CounselSolution

One objection that has been made to the independent counsel solution is that the insurer must pay for an additional attorney to defend
the insured."I9 Given the nature of the duty to defend, 210 however, this
expense is necessary if the insured is to receive the unqualified defense
provided for in the policy.' 2' Traditionally, if an insurer recognized a
conflict of interest between it and its insured, it would inform the insured of the conflict and suggest the retention of an additional attorney
at the insured's expense.' 22 Unfortunately, this sometimes placed the
insured in the exact position that he or she had purchased insurance to
avoid. Because of the high cost of litigation, the insured would sometimes find it economically unfeasible to pay an attorney to oversee the
actions of the company that it had expected to protect its interests. It is
doubtful that the reasonable expectations 123 of the insured upon entering into the insurance agreement included the payment of an attorney.
The typical defense clause says nothing about a conditional defense. 24
In Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. ,125 the California Supreme Court made
it clear that when a term of an insurance contract is ambiguous, the
reasonable expectations of the insured must be protected. 126 Imposing
the cost of independent counsel on the insurer seems reasonable in light
of the fact that the conflict of interest contingency could be provided
127
for in the contract.

Another objection that has been made to the independent counsel
solution is that independent counsel could incur exorbitant defense
118. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
119. See Browne, The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Depice for Testing the
Insurer'sDuty to Defend" A Postscriot, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 18, 25 (1975).
120. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
121. Seegenerally Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94
Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971); Boise Motor Car Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 62 Idaho 438, 112
P.2d 1011 (1941); Employers' Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 347 (1968).
122. Jordan interview, supra note 26.
123. On the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see generally Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.
2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966); Percet, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of
Reasonble Expectations, 6 FORUM 116 (1971); Note, .4 Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations as Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. Micti. J. oF L. REF. 603 (1980).
124. See note 1 supra.
125. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
126. Id. at 269-70, 419 P.2d at 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
127. See generally Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94
Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971); Employers' Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 397 (1968).
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costs that the insurer would be required to pay.128 This objection can
be overcome by requiring the insurer to pay only the reasonablecost of
defending the insured, thus protecting the insurer from inflated defense
costs.' 2 9 The courts are well equipped to determine the reasonable cost
of a defense if the insurer believes that independent counsel has incurred needless expenses.
Another objection that has been made to allowing the insured to select independent counsel is that the insured is likely to retain counsel
less experienced in trial advocacy than the insurer's counsel. 130 Although there is always a possibility that the insured will make a poor
selection of counsel, this possibility can be minimized if the insurer
provides the insured with a list of firms from which to choose. 3 1 The
list should only include firms that do not do a regular business with the
carrier to prevent the insured from retaining counsel who may feel obligation or loyalty to the insurer. There is no reason, however, that the
list could not include firms that specialize in trial practice or insurance
defense work. If the insured selects counsel from the list, the insurer is
guaranteed that the selected counsel will have the expertise necessary to
provide a defense comparable to that which the insurer would have
provided. Finally, because the insurer must only relinquish exclusive
control of the defense, the insurer is still free to participate in the defense of the suit. 13 2 Hence, the insured will still have the benefit of any
special expertise possessed by the carrier's counsel, and the insurer's
rights will be safeguarded.
Although the preceding objections may present some problems, numerous courts have adopted the independent counsel solution to resolve the conflict of interest dilemma. 133 The dilemma that exists when
the insurer's position is in conflict with that of the insured in the trial of
the injured party's claim has generally been recognized and courts have
approved the right of the insured to have separate counsel. 134 The conflict of interest that exists when the issue in dispute will not be deter128. See generally Browne, The Demise ofthe DeclaratoryJudgment Action as a Devicefor
Testing the Insurer'sDuty to Defend: A Postscriot, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 18 (1975).
129. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
130. See generally Browne, The Demise of the DeclaratoryJudgment Action as a Devicefor
Testing the Insurer's Duty to Defend- A Postscript, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 18 (1975).
131. But see id. at 27.
132. See Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 347, 354 (1971).
2d 132,
133. See, e.g., 16 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354; Thorton v. Paul, 74 Ill.
152, 384 N.E.2d 335, 343 (1978); Satterwhite v. Stolz, 79 N.M. 320, 324, 442 P.2d 810, 814 (1968)
(applying Texas law); Prashker v. United States Guar. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 584, 593, 136 N.E.2d 871,
875-76 (1956); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 396, 59 N.E.2d
199, 205 (1945).
2d at 153, 384 N.E.2d at
134. See, e.g., 16 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354; 74 Ill.
343; 79 N.M. at 324, 442 P.2d at 814 (applying Texas law).
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mined at trial, though of a slightly different nature, also entitles the
insured to independent counsel.135 While it seems clear that in the
former case the insured's interests are inimical to the interests of the
insured, and can only be protected by independent counsel, in the latter
case the insured may choose to waive the right to independent counsel
and allow the insurer to defend under a nonwaiver agreement. If the
issue in dispute is totally unrelated to the issues that will be determined
at trial and the danger of information transfer is low, the insured may
believe that the insurer is adequately motivated to defend or settle the
case. In such a case, an effective nonwaiver agreement must be drawn
and executed.
The following section will present the essential elements of a nonwaiver agreement or reservation of rights notice. These elements help
assure that the insured is fully informed of all rights and options and
guarantee that any waiver given by the insured is effective.
THE NONWAIVER AGREEMENT OR RESERVATION
OF RIGHTS NOTICE

Because some courts have held that unilateral reservation of rights
notices are ineffective without the insured's consent, 36 many insurers
37
prefer to obtain the insured's signature on a nonwaiver agreement.
If the insured refuses to sign a nonwaiver agreement, however, a reservation of rights notice may be sent to the insured. Because the insured's
silence upon receipt of a reservation of rights notice will generally be
deemed an acceptance of the notice, 38 the insured should be informed
of this fact in the notice to assure that he or she understands the significance of failing to object to the notice. In addition, the insured should
be informed of the fact that the notice can be rejected. 39 Otherwise, a
nonwaiver agreement and a reservation of rights notice should contain
the same basic information. The elements considered important by the
few courts that have examined the nature and purpose of these instruments include: (1) a clear denial of liability for the claim asserted
against the insured; (2) the specific grounds and provisions of the policy
on which the denial is based; (3) disclosure of the conflict of interest
135. See generally Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281 (Alas. 1980);
144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d 199.
136. See, e.g., Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 479, 48 N.W.2d 623, 631 (1951);
American Fidelity Co. v. Kerr -, Vt. -, -, 416 A.2d 163, 165 (1980). But see Ferguson v.
Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 254 Or. 496, 509, 460 P.2d 342, 348 (1969); Associated Indem. Corp. v.
Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2d 679, 693, 99 P.2d 420, 426 (1940).
137. See generally Welch, Reservation of Rights and DeclaratoryJudgments, 381 INs. L.J. 655
(1954).
138. See note 8 supqra.
139. See Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 479, 48 N.W.2d 623, 631 (1951).
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that exists between the insurer and the insured; (4) a recommendation

that the insured seek the advice of independent counsel prior to signing
the agreement; and (5) notification of the insured's options in light of
the insurer's denial of liability.
.4. Denial of Liability
To avoid any misunderstanding, the instrument should include a

clear denial of liability rather than an attempt to reserve the right to
deny liability at a later time.'14 In the recent California case of Miller v.

Elite Insurance Co. ,141 the First District Court of Appeal outlined the
doctrine of equitable estoppel as applied to an insurer's ability to pre-

serve the right to assert a claim of non-liability against its insured.

42

An estoppel will arise if the insurer defends without denying liability. 14 3 If the insurer denies liability and fails to withdraw from the defense or execute a nonwaiver agreement with the insured, estoppel will
prevent the insurer from denying liability at a later time. 44 Hence, to

prevent an estoppel from arising, the insurer must make clear to the
insured that it denies liability for any settlement or judgment rendered

against the insured despite the fact that it is willing to undertake the
insured's defense.' 45 Only then will the basic nature of the conflict of

interest be unmistakably clear to the insured.
B.

Spec/fc Grounds on Which the Denialof Liability is Based

A general denial or bare reservation of rights does not adequately
inform the insured of the insurer's position. 146 Thus, courts require

that the insurer include in the agreement the specific grounds or policy
provisions on which the denial is based. 4 7 The rationale underlying

140. See Popovich v. Gonzales, 4 Ill. App. 3d 227, 230, 280 N.E.2d 757, 760 (1973); Henry v.
Johnson, 191 Kan. 369, 377, 381 P.2d 538, 545 (1963). See generally CAL. INS. CODE §790.03,
which provides in pertinent part:
The following are hereby defined as unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business
of insurance....
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices ...
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of
loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
Although the language of this Section is couched in terms of claims made by the insured for
personal loss, the courts have not yet been called upon to interpret subsection (4) and may be
inclined to extend its application to claims asserted against the insured as well as claims asserted
by the insured.
141. 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1980).
142. Id. at 754-55, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 330-31.
143. See id. at 755, Cal. Rptr. at 330-31.
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. See Cowan v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 22 Ill. App. 3d 883, 896, 318 N.E.2d 315, 326 (1974).
147. See, e.g., id. at 896, 318 N.E.2d at 326; Meirthew v. Last, 376 Mich. 33, 39, 135 N.W.2d
353, 355 (1965); Weber v. Biddle, 4 Wash. App. 519, 524-25, 483 P.2d 155, 159 (1971).
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this specificity requirement is that a general denial of liability or coverage does not convey sufficient information to enable the insured to determine whether or not there is a need to be represented by
independent counsel.' 48 Only when the insured is adequately informed
of the potential defense can there be an intelligent choice between seeking independent counsel or accepting the defense tendered by the insurer.
In addition, a general denial, by its inherent vagueness, is subject to
abuse in that it can be asserted as a precautionary measure even though
no specific defense has come to the attention of the insurer.149 The
sanctioned use of general denial provisions in nonwaiver agreements or
reservation of rights notices removes the insurer's motivation to pursue
a prompt and thorough investigation. Through use of a general denial,
the insurer can preserve all possible defenses whether known to it or
not. The insured's interests are better protected if the insurer institutes
a prompt investigation at the time the insured first requests the company to defend the suit. If the insurer intends to deny coverage, the
insured should be apprised of this intention at the outset of the suit and
should not be forced to decide whether to demand control of the defense after the insurer has undertaken it.
C The Conflict of Interest
Any time an insurer defends subject to a nonwaiver agreement or
reservation of rights notice, a conflict of interest exists between the insured and the insurer because the insurer seeks to control the defense of
a suit for which it disclaims any obligation to pay a judgment rendered.' This conflict of interest imposes certain responsibilities on the
attorneys involved in the suit. 5 ' As counsel for the insured, an attorney retained by the carrier owes the same duty to the insured as would
52
have been owed had the insured retained it in the first instance.'
Therefore, when a defense becomes known to the insurer that calls for
a nonwaiver agreement to be drafted and presented to the insured, the
attorney representing the insured at the direction of the insurer must be
careful to make his or her position and loyalties clear to the insured. If
the attorney is requested by the insurer to draft and obtain the insured's
148. See 22 IM. App. 3d 883, 896, 318 N.E.2d 315, 326.
149. See generally 376 Mich. 33, 135 N.W.2d 353.
150. See Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 20, 545 P.2d 979, 982 (1976).
151. See generally Corboy, Defending Insurance Companies and the Insured-Can Two Masters
Be Served?, 55 CHI. B. REC. 102 (1973); Germer & Tebbs, Conduct ofDefense Attorney and Insur-

ance Company in Defending an Insured Where a Coverage Question Is Involved, 13 S. Tex. L.J. 223
(1972); Note, 52 TEx. L. REv. 610 (1974).
152. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968).
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signature of a nonwaiver agreement, the attorney must disclose the
conflict of interest to the insured to avoid the danger that the insured
will believe that the agreement is a mere formality or that the attorney
is recommending that the insured sign the agreement. It is essential
that the insured recognize that in this situation, the attorney is the emissary of the insurer.
Although some insured parties have the knowledge and sophistication to recognize the conflict of interest that the insurer's denial of liability presents, many will be unaware of the problem unless it is
revealed by the insurer. All of the ramifications of the insurer's denial
of liability cannot be explained within the nonwaiver agreement, but
the basic conflict of interest can be described. The insured must understand that the possibility exists that an issue will come into dispute with
the insurer that will require the insurer to relinquish control of the defense to an attorney to be selected by the insured at that time. Only if
the insured understands this aspect of the conflict can the insured make
an intelligent decision whether to select independent counsel at the outset or allow the insurer to defend.
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility
has specifically recognized that the relationship of an attorney retained
by an insurer to represent its insured often creates ethical problems for
the attorney.153 Canon 5 deals specifically with the conduct required
of a lawyer who represents clients with conflicting or potentially conflicting interests.'54 Ethical Consideration 5-16 provides:
In those instances in which a lawyer is justified in representing two or
more clients having differing interests, it is essential that each client
be given the opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free
from any potential conflict and to obtain other counsel if he so
desires. Thus before a lawyer may represent multiple clients, he
should fully explain to each client the implications of the common
representation and should accept br continue employment only if the
clients accept.
Hence, the attorney should divulge the potential conflict of interest immediately upon becoming aware of a potential defense available to the
insurer.
D. The Advice of Independent Counsel
In light of the conflict that a nonwaiver agreement creates for the
attorney retained by the insurer to represent the insured, the insured
always should have the advice of independent counsel before signing a
153. See ABA CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL REsPONSIrnLrry, Ethical Consideration 5-17 (1979).

154. See generally id.
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nonwaiver agreement. 155 In some cases, however, the insured will
agree to sign a nonwaiver agreement without consulting independent
counsel.' 56 To protect the attorney and the insurer from a claim that
their conduct was unethical, a recital should be included within the
agreement stating that the insured has been advised of the wisdom of
seeking independent legal advice and has done so or has declined to do
SO.
E

The Options Available to the Insured

As insured parties often will be unaware of their right to demand
that the insurer either abandon its defense and defend unconditionally
or withdraw from the defense, the insurer should inform the insured of
that option.'57 If the insurer does not inform the insured that the insured is entitled to a defense free from any conflict of interest, the insurer has deprived the insured of the benefits of the insurance contract
and in so doing has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'55 Arguably, the insurer's duty of disclosure would extend to informing the insured that if he or she chooses not to allow the insurer to
control the defense, independent counsel will be provided and paid for
by the insurer.' 59
The insured must understand that the agreement does more than
preserve the insurer's right to assert a defense. A nonwaiver agreement
is so named because, in theory, it prevents a waiver of the insurer's
60
rights to assert a defense to its obligation to indemnify the insured.
In actuality, the instrument has a dual purpose. First, it informs the
insured of any defense on which the insurer intends to rely and thereby
prevents the insured from mistakenly believing that the insurer admits
liability for a judgment rendered on the injured party's claim. Second,
it obtains the insured's consent to allow the insurer to defend the suit
despite the fact that the insurer denies liability for the claim against the
insured. Thus, in effect, a nonwaiver agreement constitutes a waiver of
the insured's right to be defended unconditionally.' 61 Similarly, a res155. See id. at Ethical Consideration 5-16. It has been suggested that counsel retained by the
insurer is incompetent to disclose adequately the conflict of interest that exists between the insured
and the insurer. See Note, The Insurer'sDuty to Defend Under a LiabilityInsurancePoilcy, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 734, 746 (1966).
156. Jordan interview, note 8 supra.
157. See generally Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623 (1951).
158. See generally Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1979); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
159. See generally Browne, The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Devicefor
Testing the Insurer'sDuty to De/end, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 423 (1974).
160. See generall, 7 C.J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE §4694 (1979).
161. See Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 552 S.W.2d 497, 502
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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ervation of rights notice fairly states the effect of the instrument on the
rights of the insurer but fails to indicate that the insured is relinquishing the right to assume control of the defense. When the instrument is
a unilateral reservation of rights notice the insured's silence upon receipt of the instrument generally will be deemed acquiesence.162 Unless the insured fully understands the effect and significance of the
be no effective waiver of the right to be defended
instrument, there 6can
1 3
unconditionally.
CONCLUSION

The conflicting interests of an insurance carrier and its insured when
the former seeks to defend the latter under a reservation of rights notice or nonwaiver agreement require that courts make a special effort to
protect the rights of the insured. If the company disclaims liability for a
claim against the insured, it must either abandon its defense and defend unconditionally, withdraw from the defense and risk liability for
wrongfully refusing to defend or provide the insured with independent
counsel. If the position taken by the insurer is adverse to the position
the insured must take to defend against the injured party's claim, the
insurer must relinquish exclusive control of the defense. This conflict
of interest cannot be eliminated by a nonwaiver agreement because the
insurer's interests are inimical to those of the insured. The insurer's
duty to defend in such a situation extends to paying the reasonable
value of independent counsel. Likewise, if the insurer's position is not
in direct conflict with the insured's position in the trial of the injured
party's claim against the insured, because the insurer disclaims liability
for the injured party's claim, the insurer's interests are nevertheless in
conflict with those of the insurer. Hence, the insured should be given
the option to select independent counsel at the insurer's expense.
In order to assure that the insured gives a knowing, intelligent waiver
in those cases where a nonwaiver agreement is appropriate, a nonwaiver agreement must convey sufficient information to the insured to
fully inform the insured of the insurer's position and the options available to the insured if the nonwaiver agreement is unacceptable. If the
insurer offers to provide the insured with independent counsel in those
instances in which the insurer seeks to defend the insured under a reservation of rights notice or nonwaiver agreement, the insured will understand the rights and options under such instruments. Only if the
insured understands the available options will the insured's consent to
162. See note 8 supra.
163. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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allow the insurer to defend the suit constitute an intelligent waiver of
the insured's right to an unconditional defense. Consequently, the
right of the insured to be defended free from a conflict of interest will
be safeguarded.

Ward DouglasSmith

